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Abstract—Low bit-rate speech codecs have been widely used in audio communications like VoIP 
and mobile communications, so that steganography in low bit-rate audio streams would have 
broad applications in practice. In this paper, the authors propose a new algorithm for 
steganography in low bit-rate VoIP audio streams by integrating information hiding into the 
process of speech encoding. The proposed algorithm performs data embedding while pitch 
period prediction is conducted during low bit-rate speech encoding, thus maintaining 
synchronization between information hiding and speech encoding. The steganography 
algorithm can achieve high quality of speech and prevent detection of steganalysis, but also has 
great compatibility with a standard low bit-rate speech codec without causing further delay by 
data embedding and extraction. Testing shows, with the proposed algorithm, the data 
embedding rate of the secret message can attain 4 bits / frame (133.3 bits / second).  
Index Terms—Information hiding; Low bit-rate speech codec; VoIP; G.723.1; Pitch period 
prediction1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
    Nowadays people are becoming more and more concerned about the security of private 
information transmitted over the Internet. Protecting the private information from being attacked is 
regarded as one of the major problems in the field of information security. Apart from encryption, 
digital steganography has been one of the solutions to protecting data transmission over the network 
[1]. 
Steganography is the science of covert communications that conceal the existence of secret 
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information embedded in cover media over an insecure network. A great effort has been made to 
explore the methods for embedding information in cover media, such as plaintext [2], audio files in 
WAV or MP3 [3], and images with BMP or JPEG format [4]. In recent years, computer network 
protocols and streaming media like Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) audio streams were used as 
cover media to embed secret messages [5][6]. Dittmann et al. [5], for example, suggested the design 
and evaluation of steganography in VoIP, indicating possible threats as a result of embedding secret 
messages in such a widely used communication protocol. 
The methods of speech steganography can be classified into three categories. The first is the least 
significant bit (LSB) replacement / matching method towards the pulse code modulation (PCM) 
format voice data [3]. The second hides a secret message in transform domain, firstly transforming the 
cover’s data to the transform domain, and then modifying some parameters in the domain to embed 
the secret message, with often used transform including the Cepstrum transform [7], discrete cosine 
transform [8], and so on. The third is the Quantization Index Modulation (QIM)-based method firstly 
proposed by Xiao et al. [9]. The QIM hides the secret message by modifying the quantization vector, 
which is applicable to various digital media, such as speech, image and video. It is very suitable to 
information hiding in the media compression encoding process.  
Although some methods have been suggested for speech steganography, most of which dealt 
with high bit-rate speech format like PCM. However, most codecs used in VoIP are those with low 
bit-rate, such as Internet low bit-rate codec (iLBC), G.723.1 and G.729A; this means existing 
steganographic methods do not necessarily meet all the requirements of information hiding in VoIP. 
Up to now, only little attention has been paid to steganography in low bit-rate VoIP audio streams. For 
example, in our preliminary work, we proposed a codebook partition algorithm called the 
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Complementary Neighbor Vertex (CNV) algorithm for optimally dividing the vector codebook into 
two sub-codebooks, which are needed by QIM embedding. 
In general, it is more challenging to embed information in low bit-rate VoIP streams. The first 
reason is the requisite for real-time VoIP communications. Most previous steganographic algorithms 
have been designed for embedding data in image or audio files. These algorithms usually take 
relatively long time to process data embedding. So they are not suitable for steganography in VoIP 
streams. Secondly, only a few results have so far proved conventional steganographic algorithms 
could survive low bit-rate compression. Finally, data embedding is to replace the redundancy in the 
cover media with the secret message; the less the redundancy is, the more difficult information hiding 
becomes. Unfortunately, all low bit-rate codecs are based on analysis by synthesis (AbS) that uses 
effective methods such as linear predictive coding (LPC) to eliminate redundancy. So conventional 
steganographic algorithms, i.e. replacing LSBs with the secret message, are not necessarily suitable 
for steganography in low bit-rate VoIP audio streams. 
To take on these challenges, we propose a new method for steganography in low bit-rate VoIP 
audio streams and design an enhanced speech codec to integrate the information hiding function. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related work is briefly introduced. 
Section III describes the pitch period prediction method in the hybrid speech codec. Section IV 
presents a new pitch period prediction-based algorithm for steganography in low bit-rate VoIP streams, 
and an enhanced speech codec combined with information hiding. Experimental results are discussed 
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes with a summary and directions for future work. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
Over the past few years, a number of attempts have been made to study steganography in low 
bit-rate audio streams. Some related works are introduced below.  
Several MP3stego, AAC-based audio steganographic systems have been suggested in recent 
years [10][11][12]. Wang et al. [1] proposed a scheme to convey secret messages by embedding them 
in VoIP streams. The scheme divides the steganography process into two steps, compressing the secret 
message and embedding its binary bits into the LSBs of the cover speech encoded by G.711 codec. 
Dittmann et al. [5] presented a more general scheme for steganography in VoIP, which can be used for 
transmitting an arbitrary secret message. More recently, Huang and co-workers [7] suggested an 
M-Sequence based LSB steganographic algorithm for embedding information in VoIP streams 
encoded by G.729A codec. With their algorithm, embedding data in a speech frame takes less than 20 
us on average, which is negligible in comparison with the allowable coding time of 15 ms for each 
frame in VoIP. In addition, Huang et al. [6] suggested an algorithm for embedding data in some 
parameters of the inactive speech frames encoded by G.723.1 codec. However, this algorithm is also 
based on the LSB substitution of encoded audio streams. Therefore, the algorithms above would lead 
to obvious distortion, which affects the quality of steganographic speech.  
Xiao suggested a QIM-based steganography in low bit-rate speech while encoding [9]. The QIM 
method randomly divides the whole codebook into two parts, each colored with white or black. When 
a secret bit of ‘0’ is embedded, the white codeword is used; the black codeword is used when a secret 
bit of ‘1’ is embedded. On the receiving side, the hidden bit is extracted by checking which part of the 
codebook the codeword belongs to. It is the first attempt to perform steganography and compression 
operation in the same codec. However, this information hiding algorithm has a small hiding capacity, 
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which is no use in practice. 
Our work described in this paper is the first ever effort to explore a novel method for 
steganography in low bit-rate speech based on pitch period prediction while the speech is encoded. 
The steganographic algorithm can not only achieve much higher data hiding capacity than the QIM 
algorithm [9], but also assure a good quality of speech. 
 
III. PITCH PERIOD PREDICTION IN HYBRID SPEECH CODEC 
As pitch period prediction is required in almost all speech analysis-synthesis (vocoder) systems, 
the pitch period predictor is an essential component in all speech codecs of low bit-rate. Because of 
the importance of pitch period prediction, a variety of algorithms for pitch period prediction have 
been proposed in the speech processing literature [13]-[15]. However, accurate predictions about the 
pitch period of a speech signal from the acoustic pressure waveform alone is often exceedingly 
difficult due to the reasons below. 
1) The glottal excitation waveform is not a perfect train of periodic pulses. Although finding 
the period of a perfectly periodic waveform is straightforward, predicting the period of the speech 
waveform can be quite difficult, as the speech waveform varies both in period and in the detailed 
structure of the waveform within a period.  
2) The interaction between the vocal tract and the glottal excitation also makes pitch period 
prediction difficult. In some instances, the formants of the vocal tract can significantly alter the 
structure of the glottal waveform, so that the actual pitch period is unlikely to predict. Such an 
interaction is most deleterious to pitch period prediction during fast movements of articulators while 
the formants are also changed rapidly. 
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3) The problem of accurately predicting the pitch period is the inherent difficulty in defining 
the exact beginning and end of each pitch period during voiced speech segments. Choosing the 
beginning and ending locations of the pitch period is often quite arbitrary. The pitch period 
discrepancies are arisen from the quasiperiodicity of the speech waveform, but also the fact that peak 
measurements are sensitive to the formant structure during the pitch period, whereas zero crossings of 
the waveform are sensitive to the formants, noise, and any DC level in the waveform.  
4) Another difficulty of pitch period prediction is how to distinguish between unvoiced speech 
and low-level voiced speech. In many cases, transitions between unvoiced speech segments and 
low-level voiced speech segments are very subtle, and so they are extremely hard to pinpoint.  
Apart from the difficulties in measuring the pitch period discussed above, pitch period prediction 
is also impeded by other factors. Although it is difficult to predict the pitch period, a number of 
sophisticated algorithms have been developed for pitch period prediction. Basically, algorithms for 
pitch period prediction can be classified into three categories. The first category mainly utilizes the 
time-domain properties of speech signals, the second category employs the frequency-domain 
properties of speech signals, and the third category uses both the time- and frequency-domain 
properties of speech signals. Most low bit-rate speech encoders, such as ITU G.723.1 and G.729A, 
adopt the first type of algorithms. As an example, the pitch period prediction algorithm of ITU 
G.723.1 is introduced below. 
ITU-T G.723.1 encoder operates on frames of 240 samples each, a speech frame is denoted by 
S[M] = {s[n]} n=0...239, equal to 30ms at an 8-kHz sampling rate. Each frame is divided into four 
subframes of 60 samples each. After accomplishing a series of processes, the input signal of a frame 
S[M] is converted to the weighted speech signal F[M] = {f[n]} n=0...239. For every two subframes (120 
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samples), the open-loop pitch period, LOL, is computed using the weighted speech signal f[n]. The 
pitch estimation is performed on blocks of 120 samples. The pitch period is searched in the range 
from 18 to 142 samples. Two pitch estimations are computed for every frame, one for the first two 
subframes and the other for the last two. The open-loop pitch period estimation, LOL, is computed 
using the perceptually weighted speech f [n]. A cross-correlation criterion, namely COL( j), calculated 
by using the maximization method [13], is used to determine the pitch period, as shown in (1). 
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The index j which maximizes the cross-correlation, COL( j), is selected as the open-loop pitch 
estimation for the appropriate two subframes. While searching for the best index, preference is given 
to smaller pitch periods to avoid choosing pitch multiples. Maximums of COL( j) are searched for 
beginning with j = 18. For every maximum COL( j) found, its value is compared to the best previous 
maximum found, COL( j’). The following pseudo code shows how it works: 
if (j < j’+18) 
 then (if (COL( j) > COL( j’)) 
       then (select COL( j), LOL ← j) 
) 
 else (if (COL( j) - COL( j’) > 1.25dB) 
       then (select COL( j) , LOL ← j) 
) 
Using the pitch period estimation, LOL, a closed-loop pitch predictor is computed. The pitch 
predictor in G.723.1 is a fifth order pitch predictor. The pitch prediction contribution is treated as a 
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conventional adaptive codebook contribution. For subframes 0 and 2, the closed-loop pitch lag is 
selected from around the appropriate open-loop pitch lag in the range of 1. For subframes 1 and 3, 
the closed-loop pitch lag is coded differentially using 2 bits and may differ from the previous 
subframe lag only by –1, 0, +1 or +2 [10]. 
 
IV. PITCH PERIOD PREDICTION-BASED STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM 
A. Embedding Algorithm 
In the process of G.723.1 encoding, the open-loop pitch estimation is conducted first, followed by 
closed-loop pitch prediction. The open-loop pitch estimation computes the open-loop pitch period LOL 
of a frame of speech signal F[m] = {f[n]} n=0...239. For each frame, two pitch periods are computed by 
using the first two subframes and the last two subframes, respectively. The method for computing the 
open-loop pitch period is described below. 
First, a cross-correlation criterion COL is computed by using (1), and then it searches for the 
open-loop pitch following the procedures below [13]: 
1) Suppose LOL = 8, j = 18, MaxCOL = 0; 
2 ) Using (1), compute COL(j). If 
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then LOL ← j, and MaxCOL ← COL(j) . 
3) Set j = j + 1, if j  142, return to 2), otherwise stop. 
Having obtained the pitch period LOL of a frame of speech signal F[m] = {f[n]} n=0...239, search for 
 9  
the closed-loop pitch period and embed information. 
The closed-loop pitch period of a subframe is defined by Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, and its open-loop pitch 
period is LOLi, i = 0, 1, representing the open-loop pitch periods of the first two subframes and the last 
two subframes, respectively. Adjusting LOLi yields LOLAi 
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               (4) 
The closed-loop pitch period Li is assigned a value close to the open-loop pitch period LOLi. The 
Li values for odd subframes and for even subframes are obtained from different ranges as shown in 
(5). 
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The minimum value of Li is 17, and its maximum is 143. The number of Li is equal to the number of 
elements in Ui, denoting by dim(Ui). Ui(j) represents the jth element in Ui, 0  j  dim(Ui). 
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Fig. 1. Pitch distribution probabilities of four types of untouched G.723.1 VoIP speech samples 
 
The pitch prediction contribution is treated as a conventional adaptive codebook contribution. 
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For subframes 0 and 2, the closed-loop pitch lag is selected around the appropriate open-loop pitch lag 
in the range 1 and coded using 7 bits. For subframes 1 and 3, the closed-loop pitch lag is coded 
differentially using 2 bits and may differ from the previous subframe lag only by –1, 0, +1 or +2 [13]. 
The quantized and decoded pitch lag values are referred to as Li from this point on. The pitch 
predictor gains are vector quantized using two codebooks with 85 or 170 entries for the high bit rate 
and 170 entries for the low bit rate. The 170 entry codebook is the same for both rates. For the high 
rate, if L0 is less than 58 for subframes 0 and 1 or if L2 is less than 58 for subframes 2 and 3, then the 
85 entry codebook is used for the pitch gain quantization. Otherwise, the pitch gain is quantized using 
the 170 entry codebook. We studied the pitch distribution probabilities of closed-loop pitch period of 
untouched G.723.1 VoIP speeches, and Fig. 1 shows the pitch distribution probability results for four 
types of untouched G.723.1 VoIP speeches, each with 250 samples. 
 
TABLE I 
DATA EMBEDDING AT DIFFERENT EMBEDDING BIT-RATES 
Steganography Solution (Ni) Bit-rate Embedding Subframes in f[n] 
0 1 bit / frame F0[m] 
1 1 bit / frame F1[m] 
2 1 bit / frame F2[m] 
3 1 bit / frame F3[m] 
4 2 bits / frame F0[m], F1[m] 
5 2 bits / frame F0[m], F2[m] 
6 2 bits / frame F0[m], F3[m] 
7 2 bits / frame F1[m], F2[m] 
8 2 bits / frame F1[m], F3[m] 
9 2 bits / frame F2[m], F3[m] 
10 3 bits / frame F0[m], F1[m], F2[m], 
11 3 bits / frame F0[m], F1[m], F3[m] 
12 3 bits / frame F0[m], F2[m], F3[m] 
13 3 bits / frame F1[m], F2[m], F3[m] 
14 4 bits / frame F0[m], F1[m], F2[m], F3[m] 
 
In search for the closed-loop pitch period, data embedding is accomplished by adjusting the 
searching range Ui of the pitch prediction Li of a subframe according to the secret bit information to 
be embedded. For instance, if the secret information to be embedded is ‘0’, the subframe search is 
performed on the even elements in Ui; if the secret information is ‘1’, the odd elements in Ui are 
searched. In G.723.1, each frame F[m] has four subframes, F[m] = {F0[m], F1[m], F2[m], F3[m]}, all 
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subframes require searching for the closed-loop pitch, so that data embedding can be performed on 
part of or all subframes. Therefore, we propose a series of solutions for steganography at four 
different embedding bit-rates, as shown in TABLE I, while the 15 strategies are randomly selected, 
the average data embedding rate is around 2.1 bits/frame, not 4 bits/frame. 
On the basis of the steganography solutions listed in TABLE I, a new data embedding algorithm 
is proposed below. 
Step 0: generate a random K, ki = mod(K, 14), then choose a steganography solution Ni according 
to ki and TABLE I. 
Step 1: according to Ni, decide the embedding bit-rate and where to embed the secret bit stream B 
= [b0, b1, b2, ...], i.e. which i is the subframe in the m frame, 0 < i < 4. 
Step 2: suppose the bit bi in the bit stream B is embedded in the Fi[m] subframe of the frame m, 
data embedding is conducted by using the following algorithm. 
Step 3: if bi = 0, then data are embedded in the Fi[m] subframe of the m frame, i.e. the pitch 
period ( 'il ) of the Fi[m] subframe is searched upon 
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If bi = 1, then data are embedded in the Fi[m] subframe of the m frame, i.e. the pitch period 
of the fi[m] subframe is searched upon 'iU . 
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Step 4: repeat Step 3 until the completion of data embedding of the secret message B = [b0, b1, 
b2, ...]. 
For steganography using the data embedding algorithm above, errors in predicting speech pitch 
periods can be estimated in theory. As G.723.1 samples at 8 KHz, analysis of the closed-loop pitch 
period prediction shows data embedding would lead to one sampling-point error. So the absolute error 
(g(x)) in predicting pitch period caused by data embedding can be computed by 
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If the pitch period is x = 17, the maximum of g(x) is 26.144Hz, and the relative error is 5.882%; 
If the pitch period is x = 142, the maximum of g(x) is 0.394Hz, and the relative error is 0.699%. 
Therefore, the error in pitch frequency as a result of adjusting pitch prediction is proportional to 
the pitch frequency of speech signal, but the error has a little impact on speech synthesis, particularly 
for those speech signals with lower pitch frequency. In the literature [15], the average error of the 
most advanced algorithms for predicting pitch periods is found to be  0.5 samples, indicating that the 
pitch period prediction error arising from the data embedding algorithm is within the normal range. 
 
B. Extracting Algorithm 
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The sender embeds the secret message in the low bit-rate speech streams encoded by G.723.1, 
and the bit streams containing the message are then sent to the receiver who extracts the secret 
message following the algorithm below. 
Step 1: using a negotiating mechanism, the receiver acquires the data embedding algorithm 
(steganography solution) Ni for the current speech frame F[m] = {F0[m], F1[m], F2[m], F3[m]}. 
Step 2: compute the pitch periods (Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 ) of four subframes F0[m], F1[m], F2[m], F3[m] 
of the speech frame f[m] decoded by G.723.1. 
Step 3: according to the data embedding algorithm Ni, decide which of the four subframes F0[m], 
F1[m], F2[m], F3[m] contains the secret message, and determine the bits of the message using the 
following formula 
bi=1, if mode(Li,2)=0 
         bi=0, if mode(Li,2)=1        (10) 
Step 4: repeat Step 3 until completion of decoding all speech frames, following by the bit streams 
of the secret message B = {b0, b1, … bi} to be converted to the secret message E = {e0, e1, … ei}. 
 
C. Design of the Coder with Steganography 
A joint information embedding and lossy compression method is suggested in the literature [16], 
but no attempts have been made to study data embedding integrating into low bit-rate speech 
encoding. By using a data embedding algorithm based on pitch period prediction, we here develop the 
G.723.1 low bit-rate speech codec with data embedding functionality, i.e. the embedding and 
extracting of the secret message are integrated into G.723.1 speech codec. 
To achieve data embedding while encoding in G.723.1, our specially designed secret information 
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pre-processing module, steganography solution selecting module, 'iU  updating module, and secret 
information bit stream framer module are inserted into a normal G.723.1 speech coder, as shown in 
Fig. 2. The pitch period prediction module in the codec is also modified so as to enable search for the 
closed-loop pitch upon the pitch period updating set, thus realising data embedding. Similarly, in 
order to achieve secret data extraction, the novel pitch period odd-even deciding module, 
steganography solution selecting module, secret data extraction module, and secret information 
post-processing module are built into the G.723.1 decoder, as shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 2 illustrates 
information embedding integrating into G.723.1 coder, whereas Fig. 3 shows information extraction 
along with G.723.1 decoding. 
 
 
Fig. 2. G.723.1 coder with information embedding  
 
In the process of information embedding and speech encoding, the secret message E = {e0, e1, … 
ei} are compressed to form the secret data bit stream B = {b0, b1, … bi}, which is divided into 
segments according to the data embedding algorithm. The secret segments are then embedded into 
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speech streams by adjusting pitch period prediction. 
 
Fig. 3. G.723.1 decoder with information extraction  
 
In the process of speech decoding and information extraction, G.723.1 decoder computes the 
pitch period of a subframe Fi[m], i = 0, 1, 2, 3, in the current frame F[m], decides the odd-even nature 
of the pitch period Li of the subframe by using the pitch period odd-even deciding module, determines 
the hidden data bit bi according to the odd-even nature of Li and the steganography solution Ni. The 
hidden data bit is then used to extract the secret information, E’[n] , by using the secret information 
post-processing module. 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Test Samples and Conditions 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed steganographic algorithm, we employed different 
speech sample files with PCM format as cover media for steganography to conduct experiments. The 
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speech samples are classified into four groups, Chinese Speech Man (CSM), Chinese Speech Woman 
(CSW), English Speech Man (ESM), and English Speech Woman (ESW). Each group contains 100 
pieces of speech samples with length of 3 seconds, and 100 pieces of 10-second speech samples, and 
the four groups total 800 speech samples. Each speech sample was sampled at 8000 Hz and quantized 
to 16 bits, and saved in PCM format. Those speech samples with length of 3 seconds are defined as 
the ‘Sample-3’ sample set; the ‘Sample-10’ sample contains 10-second speech samples. 
In our experiments, ITU G.723.1 codec operated at 6.3kbps, without silence compression. Fifteen 
solutions for data embedding proposed in TABLE I were used to conduct steganography at four 
different embedding bit-rates (1bit/frame, 2bits/frame, 3bits/frame, and 4bits/frame). Secret data were 
embedded into each audio frame by randomly choosing different embedding bit-rates and 
steganography solutions at equal probability. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Comparisons of time-domain amplitude plots of a 3-second CSM sample at different 
embedding bit-rates 
 
B. Results and Analysis 
Fig. 4 shows comparisons of the time-domain amplitude spectrum of an original 3-second CSM 
sample with those of the stego 3-second CSM samples at four different data embedding bit-rates. 
Almost no distortion occurred in the time domain as a result of data embedding in the speech sample; 
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no differences between the original speech sample and the stego speech samples in the time-domain 
spectrum were perceived, indicating that our proposed steganography algorithm had no or very little 
impact on the quality of the original speech. 
 
 
Fig. 5. PESQ values for 3-second samples using the proposed steganography algorithm  
 
We used the perceptual evaluation speech quality (PESQ) value to assess the subjective quality 
of the stego speech samples. Fig. 5 and 6 shows the PESQ values for the original speech samples after 
G.723.1 codec without any data embedding and the stego speech files processed by G.723.1 with data 
embedding by means of the proposed steganography algorithm (detailed in Section IV), when the 
3-second and the 10-second speech samples were used as cover media, respectively. The black curves 
are the PESQ values for the original speech samples without data hiding. Steganography was carried 
out at four different data embedding bit-rates (red curve: 1 bit/frame, green curve: 2 bits/frame, blue 
curve: 3 bits/frame, navy curve: 4 bits/frame,). As Figs 5 and 6 show, for the two types of speech 
cover media, the variations in PESQ between the original speech files and the stego speech files were 
so small, which means the proposed steganography algorithm has little effect on PESQ. 
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Fig. 6. PESQ values for 10-second samples using the proposed steganography algorithm 
 
 
Fig. 7. Comparisons of PESQ values for 3-second samples between using the proposed steganography 
algorithm and using the CNV algorithm [9] 
 
Figs. 7 and 8 show comparisons of PESQ values between using the proposed steganography 
algorithm and using the CNV algorithm (yellow curve) presented in the literature [9] for 3-second 
samples and 10-second samples, respectively. There were no obvious discrepancies in the PESQ value 
without (black curve: no hiding) and with data embedding at two different embedding bit-rates (blue 
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curve: 3 bits/frame, navy curve: 4 bits/frame). As Figs. 7 and 8 show, the variations in PESQ between 
the original speech files and the stego speech files were so small, indicating that the proposed 
information hiding along with speech compression encoding had no or very little impact on the 
quality of the synthesized speech. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Comparisons of PESQ values for 10-second samples between using the proposed 
steganography algorithm and using the CNV algorithm [9] 
 
TABLES II to V list the PESQ values for the original speech samples and the stego speech files 
obtained by using the proposed steganography algorithm, when the 3-second and the 10-second 
speech samples were used as cover media, respectively. The statistical results were obtained for 
steganography experiments conducted at four different data embedding bit-rates. The PESQ values 
ranged from 2.9 to 4.1. On average, data hiding had less effect on the PESQ values of the male speech 
samples than the female speech samples. This is probably due to the fact that the pitch frequency of 
female speech has a greater range, and changes more quickly than male speech. Analysis of TABLES 
II to V shows, as the data embedding bit-rate increases, the average worsening change in PESQ 
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increases - for 3s samples, 0.32%  0.60%  0. 96%  1.22%; for 10s samples, 0.32%  0.65%  
0. 94%  1.22%. The maximum of the average worsening change in PESQ is 0.50%, and the average 
change in PESQ is within the standard error in PESQ for the speech samples without data hiding. This 
also means data hiding has a negligible effect on PESQ. 
 
TABLE II 
PESQ STATISTICS AT 1BIT/FRAME DATA EMBEDDING BIT-RATE 
 Proposed Algorithm Without Data Embedding % Change in PESQ 
3s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average 3.53353 3.39355 3.37709 3.39173 3.53828 3.40712 3.38752 3.40776 -0.12% -0.38% -0.30% -0.46% 
Max 4.017 3.699 3.628 3.692 4.011 3.753 3.638 3.733 4.49% 3.46% 4.52% 3.07% 
Min 3.179 3.108 3.055 3.033 3.19 3.103 3.03 3.075 -3.41% -6.44% -4.36% -3.24% 
10s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average 3.46297 3.34306 3.36003 3.28841 3.46875 3.35775 3.36626 3.30512 -0.16% -0.44% -0.18% -0.50% 
Max 3.74 3.619 3.591 3.584 3.784 3.604 3.603 3.591 1.95% 0.96% 1.63% 1.94% 
Min 3.204 3.108 3.129 2.981 3.202 3.127 3.116 3.01 -2.23% -2.00% -1.96% -2.90% 
Note ‘Negative’ means a worse change in PESQ, ‘Positive’ means a better change in PESQ 
 
 
TABLE III 
PESQ STATISTICS AT 2 BITS/FRAME DATA EMBEDDING BIT-RATE 
 % Change in PESQ 
 3s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.28% -1.01% -0.16% -0.94% 
Max 5.78% 2.42% 3.47% 2.55% 
Min -3.71% -7.42% -2.61% -3.78% 
 10s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.42% -0.93% -0.22% -1.04% 
Max 2.20% 0.82% 1.37% 0.72% 
Min -2.29% -2.82% -1.81% -2.86% 
 
TABLE VI lists PESQ statistical results for the stego speech files obtained by using the 
steganography algorithm presented in [9], with cover media having the lengths of 3 and 10 seconds. 
Similarly, data embedding with the proposed algorithm led to a small change in PESQ, and the 
average change in PESQ is also within the standard error in PESQ for the speech samples without 
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data hiding. However, the previous steganography algorithm [9] resulted in a larger change in PESQ 
than our proposed algorithm, and so it had a slightly high impact on PESQ. 
 
TABLE IV 
PESQ STATISTICS AT 3 BITS/FRAME DATA EMBEDDING BIT-RATE 
 % Change in PESQ 
 3s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.59% -1.63% -0.28% -1.35% 
Max 4.14% 2.28% 3.28% 3.18% 
Min -4.17% -8.12% -2.96% -6.23% 
 10s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.52% -1.42% -0.35% -1.47% 
Max 1.51% 1.08% 2.23% 0.21% 
Min -2.32% -4.02% -2.40% -4.12% 
 
TABLE V 
PESQ STATISTICS AT 4 BITS/FRAME DATA EMBEDDING BIT-RATE 
 % Change in PESQ 
 3s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.84% -1.88% -0.38% -1.76% 
Max 4.85% 2.50% 3.24% 2.62% 
Min -5.71% -5.99% -4.05% -5.17% 
 10s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average -0.71% -1.83% -0.48% -1.86% 
Max 2.04% 1.18% 1.50% 0.03% 
Min -2.93% -4.54% -2.07% -4.52% 
 
TABLE VI 
PESQ STATISTICS USING THE STEGANOGRAPHY ALGORITHM PRESENTED IN [9] 
 Algorithm Presented in [9] Without Data Embedding % Change in PESQ 
 3s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average 3.50871 3.36577 3.35674 3.34671 3.53828 3.40712 3.38752 3.40776 -0.49% -1.05% -0.93% -1.37% 
Max 4.009 3.785 3.636 3.654 4.011 3.753 3.638 3.733 18.59% 15.50% 10.86% 15.19% 
Min 3.098 2.979 3.137 2.998 3.19 3.103 3.03 3.075 -12.73% -18.80% -11.56% -16.86% 
 10s Samples 
 CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW CSM CSW ESM ESW 
Average 3.4508 3.31336 3.35771 3.26048 3.46875 3.35775 3.36626 3.30512 -0.62% -1.44% -0.29% -1.22% 
Max 3.713 3.569 3.553 3.53 3.784 3.604 3.603 3.591 1.43% 0.51% 1.30% 1.13% 
Min 3.201 3.056 3.132 2.974 3.202 3.127 3.116 3.01 -2.44% -4.92% -1.82% -4.40% 
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TABLE VII lists comparisons of changes in PESQ between the proposed steganography 
algorithm and the CNV algorithm presented in [9]. At the same embedding bit-rate with 3-second 
speech samples, the overall average standard error for the stego speech files using the proposed 
steganography algorithm was 1.60%, 4.04% less than the CNV algorithm, with both algorithms 
leading to 0.96% change in PESQ; for 10-second speech samples, the average worsening changes in 
PESQ of CSM and CSW with the proposed algorithm were smaller, those of ESM and ESW were 
bigger, the overall worsening change in PESQ was 0.05% larger, and the standard error (0.84%) was 
0.02% larger in comparison with CNV. With the embedding bit-rate reaching 4 bits/frame, the average 
worsening change in PESQ of 3-second speech samples with the proposed algorithm was 0.26% 
larger, and the overall standard error (1.61%) was 4.03% smaller compared with CNV; for 10-second 
speech samples, the average worsening change in PESQ was 0.33% larger, and the overall standard 
error (0.90%) was 0.08% bigger than CNV. 
 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISONS OF CHANGES IN PESQ BETWEEN THE PROPOSED STEGANOGRAPHY 
ALGORITHM AND THE ONE PRESENTED IN [9] 
Steganography  
Algorithm 
Embedding  
Bit-rate 
(bits/frame) 
 
3s Samples 10s Samples 
CSM CSW ESM ESW Average CSM CSW ESM ESW Average 
Proposed Algorithm 
3 
Average -0.59% -1.63% -0.28% -1.35% -0.96% -0.52% -1.42% -0.35% -1.47% -0.94% 
St error 1.61% 1.80% 1.41% 1.57% 1.60% 0.87% 0.89% 0.77% 0.83% 0.84% 
4 
Average -0.84% -1.88% -0.38% -1.76% -1.22% -0.71% -1.83% -0.48% -1.86% -1.22% 
St error 1.81% 1.76% 1.30% 1.57% 1.61% 0.93% 0.97% 0.77% 0.94% 0.90% 
Algorithm Presented in 
[9] 3 
Average -0.49% -1.05% -0.93% -1.37% -0.96% -0.62% -1.44% -0.29% -1.22% -0.89% 
St error 6.13% 6.53% 4.73% 5.17% 5.64% 0.76% 0.96% 0.68% 0.86% 0.82% 
 
TABLE VIII lists differences in PESQ between normal en- and decoding and data hiding using 
different algorithms. When using the proposed steganography algorithm, the average worsening 
change in PESQ and the standard error of both 3s and 10s speech samples were within the range of 
the standard error of normal en- and decoding. For the algorithm presented in [9], this was the case for 
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the 10s speech samples only. In comparison with the previous algorithm, the proposed algorithm had 
less impact on PESQ at lower data embedding bit-rates; when the data embedding bit-rate increased to 
4 bits/frame, the average worsening change in PESQ was 0.295% larger, and the overall average 
standard error was 1.975% less than the previous algorithm. 
 
TABLE VIII 
DIFFERENCES IN PESQ BETWEEN NORMAL EN- AND DECODING AND DATA HIDING 
USING DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS  
 
Embedding  
Bit-rate 
(bits/frame) 
 
3s Samples 10s Samples 
CSM CSW ESM ESW Average CSM CSW ESM ESW Average 
Normal en- and 
Decoding 0 St error 0.1551  0.1518  0.1124  0.1214  0.1352  0.1234  0.1148  0.1109  0.1201  0.1173  
Proposed 
Algorithm 
3 
Average -0.0215 -0.0559 -0.0097 -0.0460 -0.0333  -0.0182 -0.0478 -0.0118 -0.0487 -0.0316  
St error 0.0570  0.0616  0.0476  0.0533  0.0549  0.0306  0.0301  0.0261  0.0279  0.0287  
4 
Average -0.0301 -0.0642 -0.0131 -0.0602 -0.0419  -0.0248 -0.0616 -0.0163 -0.0614 -0.0410  
St error 0.0641  0.0601  0.0436  0.0533  0.0553  0.0328  0.0329  0.0259  0.0312  0.0307  
Algorithm 
Presented in [9] 3 
Average -0.0239 -0.0425 -0.0356 -0.0514 -0.0384  -0.0216 -0.0484 -0.0097 -0.0404 -0.0300  
St error 0.2163  0.2242  0.1608  0.1762  0.1944  0.0266  0.0324  0.0229  0.0287  0.0276  
 
To evaluate the security of the proposed steganography algorithm, we employed the latest 
steganalysis method [17]-[20], which uses Derivative Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
(DMFCC)-based Support Vector Machine (SVM) to detect audio steganography. SVM set RBF core 
function as its default parameter. 
The test samples used were 501 CSM samples (300 as training samples, and 201 as test samples), 
533 CSW samples (300 as training samples, and 233 as test samples), 819 ESM samples (600 as 
training samples, and 219 as test samples), 825 ESM samples (600 as training samples, and 225 as test 
samples), and Hybrid samples containing CSM, CSM, ESM and ESW samples. These five sorts of 
speech samples were used as the cover media in which data embedding at 4 bits / frame took place by 
using the proposed steganography algorithm and the one presented in [6]. The steganalysis results are 
listed in TABLES IX and X. 
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TABLE IX 
STEGANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE LITERATURE [6] ALGORITHM USING DMFCC AT 
DIFFERENT DETECTION WINDOWS (DATA EMBEDDING RATE OF 3 BITS/FRAME) 
Window Length（frames） CSM（%） CSW（%） ESM（%） ESW（%） Hybrid（%） 
1 53.2 55.6391 52.9268 51.2136 51.6442 
10 63.6 66.9173 63.6585 64.3204 65.2466 
20 71.2 81.5789 66.8293 70.6311 70.5531 
40 77.2 85.3383 73.9024 74.7573 75.5605 
80 78.4 92.1053 80.4878 84.9515 82.7354 
150 81.6 95.8647 82.6829 91.2621 87.2945 
200 86.0 95.8647 86.5854 93.4466 90.8072 
250 88.4 97.3684 90.4878 94.6602 92.8699 
300 91.6 97.7444 91.2195 94.4175 91.4798 
333 93.2 98.4962 91.9592 95.3883 92.8996 
 
In the experiments, we used LIBSVM Version 3.0 [21]. In the SVM-scale of LIBSVM, the lower 
is -1, the upper is 1, and the other parameters used are default values. In the SVM-train of LIBSVM, 
the svm_type is C-SVC, the kernel_type is RBF (radial basis function), the cost is 1000, the epsilon is 
0.00001, and the other parameters used are default values. 
 
TABLE X 
STEGANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM USING DMFCC AT 
DIFFERENT DETECTION WINDOWS (DATA EMBEDDING RATE OF 3 BITS/FRAME) 
Window Length（frames） CSM（%） CSW（%） ESM（%） ESW（%） Hybrid（%） 
1 47.2 49.6241 49.0244 50 50.7474 
10 48.8 49.2481 50.7317 48.7864 49.1031 
20 47.2 56.391 48.5366 51.699 52.5411 
40 51.2 53.7594 50.4878 51.9417 52.2422 
80 51.2 55.2632 51.7073 55.0971 52.0179 
150 50.4 51.5038 54.878 53.6408 51.7937 
200 48.4 53.3835 51.4634 53.6408 53.2885 
250 54 58.6466 49.0244 54.8544 55.2317 
300 52.4 51.8797 52.439 53.8835 52.9895 
333 50.8 57.5188 53.4146 58.7379 53.139 
Average 50.16 53.72182 51.17072 53.22816 52.30941 
Standard Variance 2.232686 3.221547 2.043203 2.816783 1.625442 
Max 54 58.6466 54.878 58.7379 55.2317 
Min 47.2 49.2481 48.5366 48.7864 49.1031 
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As TABLE IX shows, when the detection window length was 150 frames, the accuracy of 
DMFCC in detecting steganography using the algorithm suggested in [6] reached 80% for all the five 
types of speech samples, and increased further to over 90% at detection window length of 300 frames. 
This indicates that DMFCC is very effective in detecting the old steganography algorithm [6]. 
TABLE X shows the accuracy of DMFCC in detecting steganography with the proposed 
algorithm barely achieved 53% for five types of speech samples, with the maximum accuracy up to 
56%, indicating that the proposed steganography algorithm is unlikely to be detected by DMFCC 
audio steganalysis. 
 
TABLE XI 
STEGANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM USING THE MARKOV-DMFCC APPROACH [22] 
[23] AT DIFFERENT DETECTION WINDOWS (DATA EMBEDDING RATE OF 3 BITS/FRAME) 
Windows Length (frames) CSM (%) CSW (%) ESM (%) ESW (%) Hybrid (%) 
1 48.4 46.6165 47.3171 45.8738 49.5516 
10 48.8 48.1203 46.3415 46.3592 50.1495 
20 49.2 48.4962 48.0488 47.8155 50.3737 
40 50.8 48.8722 50.2439 47.8155 50.5232 
80 51.6 49.2481 50.2439 48.0583 50.5979 
150 51.6 50.7519 50.7317 48.0583 50.6726 
200 52.4 51.1278 50.9756 51.699 51.42 
250 52.4 51.8797 51.7073 52.1845 51.42 
300 52.8 52.6316 52.1951 52.6699 52.1674 
333 54 53.3835 52.439 53.1553 52.3916 
Average 51.2 50.11278 50.02439 49.36893 50.92675 
Standard Variance 1.866667 2.178093 2.099524 2.75128 0.901122 
Max 54 53.3835 52.439 53.1553 52.3916 
Min 48.4 46.6165 46.3415 45.8738 49.5516 
 
We also adopted the latest DMFCC audio steganalysis, Second-order derivative-based Markov 
approach for audio steganalysis [22] [23], to detect VoIP steganography with the proposed 
steganographic algorithm, and the results are presented in TABLE XI. As TABLE XI shows, the 
average accuracy of Markov-DMFCC steganalysis in detecting steganography with the proposed 
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algorithm just reached 51% for five different types of speech samples, with the maximum accuracy up 
to 54%, which means the proposed steganographic algorithm is unlikely to be detected by 
Markov-DMFCC steganalysis. This was probably due to the ineffectiveness of Markov-DMFCC 
steganalysis through analyzing Markov transition features, in detecting the proposed steganographic 
algorithm, which uses the pitch lag parameters substitution. 
Fig. 9 shows comparisons of steganalysis results of two algorithms using DMFCC at different 
detection window lengths when Hybrid speech samples were used as cover media. As the detection 
window length increased, the accuracy of DMFCC in detecting the steganography algorithm 
presented in [6] improved significantly; the detection accuracy attained 90% when the detection 
window length reached 200 frames. By contrast, DMFCC was not effective in detecting the proposed 
steganography algorithm at different detection window lengths. 
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Fig. 9. Comparisons of steganalysis results of two algorithms using DMFCC at different detection 
window lengths 
 
Fig. 10 shows the pitch distribution probabilities of G.723.1 VoIP samples (duration of 20 
seconds) without and with data embedding. No obvious changes in the statistical property of the 
closed-loop pitch periods in the speech samples after G.723.1 codec without or with data embedding 
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had been found for four types of VoIP audio samples, indicating that the proposed steganographic 
system retains the statistical property of original closed-loop pitch periods. 
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Fig. 10. Pitch distribution probabilities of G.723.1 VoIP samples (duration of 20 seconds) without and 
with data embedding 
 
We carried out extra steganalysis experiments. As our proposed steganographic algorithm is 
based on pitch period prediction, pitch statistical characteristic-based steganalysis was specially 
designed in a way that suppose eavesdroppers know our steganographic algorithm 
(Kerckhoffs’-compliant), with VoIP samples of 3s, 5s, 10s, 20s and 30s in length with and without 
steganography being available, through analyzing pitch lag of VoIP samples with and without 
steganography eavesdroppers obtained the first-order pitch statistical characteristics, which were 
classified by using SVM (similar to DMFCC detection method in set-up), and the detection results are 
presented in TABLE XII. As the table shows, at five different detection window lengths, the accuracy 
in detecting steganography was below 70%, indicating that our proposed steganographic algorithm is 
capable of standing against steganalysis. 
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TABLE XII 
STEGANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM USING SVM AT DIFFERENT 
DETECTION WINDOWS 
Window Length CSM (%) CSW (%) ESM (%) ESW (%) Hybrid (%) 
3s 60.8000 61.2782 60.2439 58.2524 59.5665 
5s 64.8000 64.2857 63.6585 60.6796 63.9656 
10s 67.2000 69.5489 66.3415 57.7670 64.3498 
20s 68.8636 65.0000 66.5000 61.5909 66.8636 
30s 69.8889 68.0000 67.8571 63.6500 68.6429 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed a new method for steganography in low bit-rate VoIP streams 
based on pitch period prediction. On the basis of ITU G.723.1, a widely used low bit-rate speech 
codec, we have developed a much-improved G.723.1 speech codec with the information hiding 
functionality. Fifteen solutions for steganography have been suggested to perform on VoIP speech 
samples at four data embedding bit-rates taking into account the characteristics of G.723.1. The 
experimental results have shown that the worsening change in PESQ of the stego speech files 
obtained by using the proposed steganography algorithm was within 1.2%, indicating little impact on 
the quality of speech. In comparison with a previous algorithm [9], the proposed steganography 
algorithm has been found to have slightly larger effect on PESQ for 3s speech samples, but have less 
effect for 10s speech samples at 3 bits/frame data embedding rate; the worsening change in PESQ was 
0.298% higher as the data embedding bit-rate reaching 4 bits/frame (33.3% increase than the old 
algorithm). Steganalysis tests using DMFCC-SVM have shown that the proposed steganography 
algorithm could prevent from being detected by steganalysis. Investigation into the applicability of the 
proposed algorithm to other low bit-rate speech codecs shall be the subject of future work. The 
steganalysis performance with different classifiers such as Fisher's linear classifier and logistic 
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regression shall be part of future work. 
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